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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes on before this Court on the appeal of 
SIH Partners LLLP Explorer Partner Corp., Tax Matters Partner, 
challenging a United States Tax Court decision on summary 
judgment holding it liable for back income taxes.  For the 
reasons stated below, exercising plenary review, see Duquesne 
Light Holdings, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r of Internal 
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Revenue, 861 F.3d 396, 403 (3d Cir. 2017), we will affirm the 
decision and order of the Tax Court. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In its comprehensive opinion, the Tax Court made 
detailed factual findings which we accept.  See SIH Partners 
LLLP v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 3427-15, 2018 WL 
487089, at *1-4 (T.C. Jan. 18, 2018).  We point out, however, 
that the Court found many facts that are immaterial to our 
analysis.1  Though the financial history of this case is very 
complex the issues before us boil down to whether a United 
States entity incurs taxes on income made by its Controlled 
Foreign Corporations (“CFC”)2 in circumstances defined by 
applicable statutes and their implementing regulations, and, if 
so, the tax rate on the income. 
Normally, a CFC’s income is not taxable to its domestic 
shareholder or shareholders unless and until the income is 
                                                 
1 This is not surprising because the Tax Court recited that “[w]e 
state the stipulated facts in greater detail than may be necessary 
so that the record is complete.”  SIH Partners v. Comm’r, 2018 
WL 487089, at *1. 
 
2 CFC is defined as “any foreign corporation if more than 50 
percent of—(1) the total combined voting power of all classes of 
stock of such corporation entitled to vote, or (2) the total value 
of the stock of such corporation[—]is owned . . . or is 
considered as owned . . . by United States shareholders on any 
day during the taxable year of such foreign corporation.”  26 
U.S.C. § 957(a). 
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distributed to them, a process commonly known as repatriation.  
Thus, a domestic shareholder in a CFC does not incur a taxable 
event by reason of its CFC earning income until the shareholder 
actually receives a monetary return from its foreign investment 
and holdings.  In the face of this straight-forward principle, 
easily stated though not always easily applied, taxpayers 
attempting to avoid domestic taxes though nevertheless seeking 
to benefit from foreign earnings of their CFC hit upon the idea 
of taking loans either from the CFC or from third-party financial 
institutions using the CFC’s assets as collateral or having the 
CFC guarantee the loans.  Even though those maneuvers 
allowed domestic shareholders to benefit from a CFC’s 
earnings, it appears that prior to 1962 the IRS did not consider 
the taking of a collateralized or guaranteed loan from or with the 
participation of a CFC as a taxable event, even though the 
process allowed domestic shareholders effectively to obtain a 
monetary return on their foreign investment.   
The foregoing tax avoidness method permitted a 
domestic shareholder to delay indefinitely any taxes on foreign 
income, while making use of the foreign income by 
continuously taking out loans using its CFC’s assets as collateral 
or by having the CFC guarantee the loans.  Domestic 
corporations exploited this loophole by forming CFCs in foreign 
tax havens to which they transferred portable income, thereby 
avoiding or at least delaying taxes on the income at United 
States domestic tax rates, even though the taxpayers had the 
benefit of having received the income. 
Not surprisingly Congress took steps to close the CFC 
loophole by enacting the Revenue Act of 1962 (“Act”) “to 
prevent the repatriation of income to the United States in a 
manner which does not subject it to U.S. taxation.”  Dougherty 
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v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 60 T.C. 917, 929 (1973) 
(citation omitted).  The Act essentially requires the inclusion in 
the domestic shareholder’s annual income of any increase in 
investment in United States properties made by a CFC it 
controls.  The rationale for the Act is clear—any investment by a 
CFC in United States properties is tantamount to its repatriation. 
 Id.  United States property is defined as including, among other 
things, “an obligation of a United States person[.]”  26 U.S.C. § 
956(c)(1)(C); see also id. § 951.  The Act goes further as it 
provides that “a controlled foreign corporation shall, under 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary [of the Treasury], be 
considered as holding an obligation of a United States person if 
such controlled foreign corporation is a pledgor or guarantor of 
such obligations.”  Id. § 956(d). 
Taking up the baton from Congress, in 1964 the IRS 
promulgated the two regulations at issue in this case.  First, the 
agency determined when a CFC’s pledge or guarantee would 
result in the CFC being deemed the holder of the loan: 
[A]ny obligation of a United States person with 
respect to which a controlled foreign corporation . 
. . is a pledgor or guarantor will be considered to 
be held by the controlled foreign corporation . . . . 
26 C.F.R. § 1.956-2(c)(1).  Second, the IRS determined how 
much of the “obligation” a CFC pledgor or guarantor would be 
deemed to hold: 
[T]he amount of an obligation treated as held . . . 
as a result of a pledge or guarantee described in § 
1.956-2(c) is the unpaid principal amount of the 
obligation . . . . 
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Id. § 1.956-1(e)(2).  As the Tax Court summarized, “a CFC 
whose assets serve (even though indirectly) as security for the 
performance of an obligation of a United States person will be 
considered a pledgor or guarantor of that obligation.”  SIH 
Partners, 2018 WL 487089, at *5. 
 Apparently the regulations were unchallenged for an 
extended period.  But almost 50 years after their adoption, these 
statutes and regulations have come to bite Appellant, one of a 
cluster of companies affiliated with Susquehanna International 
Holdings (“SIH”).  Through the SIH family, Appellant owns 
two CFCs.  Another SIH affiliate, investment firm SIG, 
borrowed $1.5 billion from Merrill Lynch in 2007 in a loan 
guaranteed by over thirty SIH affiliates, including the two CFCs 
that Appellant owns.  Even though the loan dwarfed the CFCs’ 
assets that were roughly $240 million, Merrill Lynch insisted on 
having the CFCs guarantee the loan in order to “ring fence” the 
transaction—that is, for protection in case the deeper-pocketed 
domestic guarantors tried to dump their assets overseas with the 
CFCs. 
 In 2011, when the CFCs distributed earnings to 
Appellant, their domestic shareholder, the IRS stepped in.  
Applying the above regulations, the agency determined that 
Appellant should have reported its income from the CFCs at the 
time the CFCs guaranteed the loan to SIG.  Per the regulations, 
the IRS treated each CFC as if it had made the entire loan 
directly, though the amount included in Appellant’s income was 
reduced from the $1.5 billion principal of the loan to the CFCs’ 
combined “applicable earnings.”  See 26 U.S.C. § 956(a)(2) 
(capping the taxable income to domestic shareholders at “the 
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applicable earnings of such controlled foreign corporation”).  
This addition to income even in the reduced amount was no 
small thing, as it resulted in an additional tax of $378,312,576 to 
Appellant. 
 Having applied its regulations to increase Appellant’s 
taxable income and accelerate the tax date from 2011 to 2007, 
the IRS took the final step of raising Appellant’s tax rate.  
Although the 2011 distribution of CFC earnings to Appellant 
would have been taxed at the 15% rate for “qualified dividend 
income” under 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(11)(B)(i), the IRS found that its 
accelerated income inclusion through §§ 956(c)(1)(C) and 
956(d) was not a dividend and therefore was taxable at the then 
applicable 35% rate for ordinary income.  In the Tax Court, 
Appellant challenged both the validity of the § 956(d) 
regulations and the use of the ordinary income tax rate.  These 
proceedings followed and resulted in the Tax Court granting 
summary judgment to the IRS, so Appellant lost on both issues. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Validity of the Regulations 
 Before we begin our analysis, we note that Appellant 
does not challenge the Commissioner’s calculations with regard 
to the amount of its taxable income.  Instead, it argues that the 
implementing regulations are invalid because they are arbitrary 
and capricious and violate the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and thus the addition to its 
income was unauthorized.  Inasmuch as Appellant does not 
challenge the Commissioner’s calculation of the amount 
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included in its income, we need not explain how the 
Commissioner made his calculations. 
While we appreciate and agree with the Tax Court’s 
masterful analysis rejecting Appellant’s argument challenging 
the validity of the regulations, we need not explicitly rely on that 
analysis because Appellant’s argument fails for a reason on 
which the Tax Court did not rely, inasmuch as Appellant asks us 
to review the regulations taking into account hindsight derived 
from matters occurring after their adoption.  The Tax Court did 
not address the hindsight issue, but Appellant almost invited us 
to do so, for in its brief it argues that the IRS practice shows that 
the regulations are unreasonable.  Appellant’s br. 32.  The IRS’s 
practice, of course, followed the adoption of the regulations.  
Though the Commissioner has not raised this hindsight point on 
this appeal as a ground to affirm, we nevertheless consider it 
because a “court of appeals may affirm Tax Court decisions on 
any grounds found in the record regardless of Tax Court’s 
rationale[.]”  ACM P’ship v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 157 
F.3d 231, 249 n.33 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).  Thus, 
“[w]e may affirm a [decision of a lower] court for any reason 
supported by the record,” Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r, 
N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 796 F.3d 293, 300-01 (3d Cir. 
2015), even though no party has advanced the reason to affirm.  
See Kline v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 662 F. App’x 121, 124 n.2 
(3d Cir. 2016). 
The rule supporting our approach with respect to 
hindsight evidence is clear, for we have stated that when 
reviewing an agency action under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 
706(2)(A), we must confine our review to “the full 
administrative record that was before the [agency] at the time” it 
took the action under review.  C.K. v. N.J. Dep’t of Health and 
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Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
420, 91 S.Ct. 814, 825 (1971)); see Tinicum Twp. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Transp., 685 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2012).  Specifically, 
Appellant argues that the regulations are arbitrary and 
capricious, because they do not take into consideration the 
possibility that if the IRS considers individually multiple CFCs 
that guaranteed the entire loan, the CFC shareholder may incur 
income larger than the loan, indeed potentially an amount 
multiple times the loan.  Appellant further argues that even 
though certain loans triggering the taxable event could not have 
been made without the security provided by a CFC’s guarantee, 
such is not always the case, so only those guarantees that are 
necessary for a shareholder to obtain a loan should be regarded 
as a repatriation and accordingly be treated as income to the 
domestic shareholder.   
In support of the two above contentions, Appellant cites 
to the IRS’s internal guidance, stating that the inclusion of 
income under § 956(c)(1)(C) of the Act should be determined on 
the facts and circumstances of each case to ascertain if there has 
been a repatriation of earnings.  Appellant’s br. 33-34.  But 
Appellant’s argument runs into the insurmountable obstacle that 
every guidance and ruling it cites in its brief occurred decades 
after the promulgation of the regulations under the Act in 1964.   
In the circumstances, though the authorities might 
demonstrate the IRS’s post-adoption recognition that the 
regulations do not always address economic reality, they are not 
evidence that the regulations were arbitrary or capricious at the 
time they were promulgated.  We cannot and will not find half-
century old regulations arbitrary and capricious, based on 
insights gained in the decades after their promulgation, when the 
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challenger, here Appellant, has not made a showing that those 
insights were known or, perhaps, at least should have been 
known to the agency at the time of the regulations’ 
promulgation.  See San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. 
Locke, 776 F.3d 971, 993 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Reviewing courts 
may admit evidence . . . only to help the court understand 
whether the agency complied with the APA’s requirement that 
the agency’s decision be neither arbitrary nor capricious. . . .  
But reviewing courts may not look to this evidence as a basis for 
questioning the agency’s . . . analyses or conclusions.”); Fearin 
v. Fox Creek Valley Conservancy Dist., 793 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 
1986) (“While such subsequent factors may have some 
relevance, we may not simply substitute our judgment, improved 
by the luxury of hindsight, for that of the [agency], and hence 
cannot consider them as controlling.”).3 
                                                 
3 Appellant’s APA claim may be generously construed as 
asserting a claim under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), to “compel agency 
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed[.]”  After 
all, we regard Appellant’s argument as not so much that the 
initial regulations were arbitrary and capricious, but that the IRS 
failed to amend or promulgate new regulations to conform to 
later observed economic realities.  Appellant, however, has not 
shown that it requested the IRS to amend its regulations.  See 
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1378, 
1389-90 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (“[W]hy could respondents not ask the federal 
agency to interpret its rules to respondents’ satisfaction, to 
modify those rules, to promulgate new rules or to enforce old 
ones?”); Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Comm’r, FDA, 
740 F.2d 21, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that plaintiff must 
exhaust administrative remedies before asserting a claim that an 
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When we raised the hindsight problem with Appellant at 
oral argument, Appellant argued that even at the time they were 
promulgated the regulations were arbitrary and capricious 
because the IRS failed to exercise its expertise to recognize the 
issues Appellant raises here.  But the Supreme Court never has 
held that agency regulations must be the best or the most perfect 
solution possible to the problem at hand given the record before 
it.  Rather, as that Court has explained: 
The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and 
capricious’ standard is narrow.  A court is not to 
ask whether a regulatory decision is the best one 
possible or even whether it is better than the 
alternatives.  Rather, the court must uphold a rule 
if the agency has examined the relevant 
considerations and articulated a satisfactory 
explanation for its action, including a rational 
connection between the facts found and the 
choice made. 
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S.Ct. 760, 782 (2016) 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 We see nothing arbitrary and capricious in the regulations 
which make an obvious and straight-forward determination that 
                                                                                                             
agency failed to act); see also In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. 
Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig., 751 F.3d 629, 634 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (“Absent a statutory duty to promulgate a new rule, a 
court cannot order it.”).  We hasten to add, however, that we do 
not suggest that if Appellant formally had made such a request 
and it was rejected, our result would have been different.  We do 
not address this point because there was no such request.  
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the amount to be included in the domestic shareholder’s income 
should equal the amount of the loan the CFC guaranteed up to 
the amount of the CFC’s earnings.  After all, no reasonable 
argument could be made otherwise with respect to the income to 
be included in the shareholder’s income if the CFC makes a 
direct loan to its domestic shareholders.  Consequently, it makes 
logical sense to hold that loan guarantees should be treated the 
same as a direct loan, a position supported by a straight-forward 
reading of the Act.  See 26 U.S.C. § 956(d). 
 Appellant argues that, by enacting § 956(d) separately, 
Congress intended the Commissioner to promulgate more 
substantive regulations in its treatment of § 956(c)(1)(C) 
income, but Appellant does not explain what substantive 
mandates § 956(d) specifically imposed, and it certainly does 
not explain how the enactment of § 956(d) relates to the two 
issues it raises here that we describe above.  There is no showing 
that Congress even recognized these issues.  Absent evidence 
that the agency failed to follow a clear statutory mandate, we 
cannot find that the regulations were arbitrary and capricious.  
“If a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s 
construction is reasonable, [Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984)] 
requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of 
the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from what the 
court believes is the best statutory interpretation.”  Nat’l Cable 
& Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
980, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2699 (2005) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843-44 & n.11, 104 S.Ct. at 2782 & n.11).  “Where Congress 
has not merely failed to address a precise question, but has given 
an ‘express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a 
specific provision of the statute by regulation,’ then the agency’s 
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‘legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they 
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”  
Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 112 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, 104 S.Ct. at 2782).  Nothing in the 
record here shows that the agency’s interpretation of the scope 
of the statutes was unreasonable, or that the regulations in 
question failed to implement an articulable statutory mandate.  
Though there were other things the agency could have addressed 
in the regulations, we only review what it did.4 
 Moreover, as the Tax Court noted in its opinion, when 
the agency solicited public comments about the regulations 
when it was considering their adoption, it did not receive any 
comment about the possibility of multiple-counting of loan 
guarantors being an issue with the regulations.  SIH Partners, 
2018 WL 487089, at *7.  Furthermore, the Commissioner noted 
at oral argument that he was unaware of a single instance where 
the inclusion of income under § 956(c)(1)(C) has resulted in the 
domestic shareholder receiving income greater than the loan 
amount.  Appellant does not claim that it did in this case.  It very 
                                                 
4 Appellant also argues that the regulations were arbitrary and 
capricious because the agency failed to promulgate regulations 
to ensure that only those obligations that amount to a 
repatriation in substance should be included as income, because 
Congress only intended to capture as income those transactions 
that are “substantially the equivalent of a dividend.”  
Appellant’s br. 27.  However, the plain language of the statutes 
in question does not impose this requirement on the agency.  We 
do not read absent words into a statute “so that what was 
omitted, presumably by inadvertence, may be included within its 
scope.”  Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538, 124 S.Ct. 
1023, 1032 (2004). 
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well could be that the practice of loan guarantees by multiple 
CFCs was exceedingly rare or simply did not occur back in 1964 
and thus escaped agency consideration when it adopted the 
regulations, or that the hypothetical multiple-counting problem 
was not serious enough to require further examination.  
Appellant does not provide evidence suggesting another 
explanation.   
Additionally, in 2015, the IRS did consider amending the 
regulations to include a cap on the inclusion of all income under 
§ 956(c)(1)(C) to that of the loan amount guaranteed, see 80 
Fed. Reg. 53,058, 53,062 (2015) (noting that “there could be 
multiple section 951 inclusions with respect to the same 
obligation that exceed, in the aggregate, the unpaid principal 
amount of the obligation” and requesting comments “on whether 
the Treasury Department and the IRS should adopt” a rule 
limiting this result), but decided against it.  See Crestek, Inc. v. 
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 149 T.C. 112, 129 n.8 (2017) 
(explaining the IRS’s decision not to issue final rules).  Even 50 
years after the adoption of the regulations at a time that the IRS 
had the benefit of hindsight with respect to the regulations’ 
application in practice, it chose to maintain the status quo.  
Evidently, the Commissioner did not consider the multiple 
counting issue a serious enough problem to warrant amendment 
of the regulations to deal with it.   
In any event, we are satisfied that the regulations are not 
arbitrary or capricious merely because they may not adhere to 
the policies embodied in the statutes in every case.  As the 
Supreme Court has recognized, “there are numerous federal 
statutes that could be said to embody countless policies.  If 
agency action may be disturbed whenever a reviewing court is 
able to point to an arguably relevant statutory policy that was not 
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explicitly considered, then a very large number of agency 
decisions might be open to judicial invalidation.”  Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 646, 110 S.Ct. 
2668, 2676 (1990).  To sum up this portion of our opinion, we 
see no compelling or even plausible reason to intervene under 
the APA to invalidate the regulations.5 
Appellant further argues that even if we uphold the 
regulations, we should remand the matter to the IRS and require 
it to employ a facts-and-circumstances determination with 
respect to their application in this case, as Appellant asserts that 
IRS internal guidances, in particular Revenue Ruling 89-73, 
required it to make such an analysis.  See Appellant’s br. 33.  
Appellant contends that because the CFC guarantees were not 
                                                 
5 To the extent Appellant argues that the agency did not provide 
an adequate explanation for its implementation of the 
regulations, we note that the regulations track the text of 
§ 956(d) nearly verbatim.  The almost word-for-word match 
keeps the IRS’s terse explanation in line with the general 
principle that the more a regulation departs from a statute, the 
more an agency must explain itself.  Cf. Good Fortune Shipping 
SA v. Comm’r of IRS, 897 F.3d 256, 262 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(faulting the IRS for providing “only a single, undeveloped 
statement” of explanation for a rule that “appear[ed] to rewrite” 
statutory rules surrounding stock ownership); Dominion Res., 
Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1317–19 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(faulting the IRS for offering only “the general statement that 
the regulations are intended to implement” the statute, even as 
one regulation “directly contradict[ed]” the statute).  Because 
the challenged regulations barely rocked the statutory boat, and 
because of the lack of public commentary and the straight-
forward nature of the regulations, little explanation was needed. 
  17 
essential to its domestic parent entity’s ability to obtain the 
loans, the guarantees should not have been deemed as 
investments in United States properties under § 956(c)(1)(C), 
and thus should not have been included in its income.  It further 
argues that Merrill Lynch insisted on the CFC guarantees to 
ensure that the domestic entity could not simply transfer assets 
to the CFCs in the event of its insolvency or default.  The Tax 
Court in considering this point held that: 
Neither section 956(d) nor the regulations inquire 
into the relative importance that a creditor 
attaches to a guaranty.  A guarantor’s precise 
financial condition or the likelihood that it would 
be able to make good on its guaranty are 
irrelevant in determining under the regulations 
whether the guaranty gives rise to an investment 
in United States property.  The regulations 
applicable in this case provide categorically that 
any obligation of a United States person with 
respect to which the CFC is a guarantor shall be 
considered United States property held by the 
CFC in the amount equal to the unpaid principal.  
They make no provision for reducing the section 
956 inclusion by reference to the guarantor’s 
financial strength or its relative creditworthiness. 
SIH Partners, 2018 WL 487089, at *15 (citations omitted). 
 Surely the Tax Court was correct.  Neither the Act nor the 
regulations nor any other statute states that the purpose of a CFC 
loan guarantee should be a factor in the determination of what 
constitutes § 956(c)(1)(C) income.  Although Appellant argues 
that the IRS should have employed its own facts-and-
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circumstances guidance and determined that the guarantees were 
not in substance repatriations, internal guidance directions are 
not binding on an agency and do not have the force of law.  See 
Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789, 101 S.Ct. 1468, 1471 
(1981).  “A revenue ruling is simply the opinion of the Service’s 
legal counsel which has not received the approval of the 
Secretary nor of Congress.  A ruling is not a regulation and does 
not bind the IRS.”  Temple Univ. v. United States, 769 F.2d 
126, 137 (3d Cir. 1985).  “[A]lthough revenue rulings may be 
helpful, they do not have the force of law.”  Geib v. N.Y. State 
Teamsters Conference Pension & Ret. Fund, 758 F.2d 973, 976 
(3d Cir. 1985).  Moreover, Appellant’s contention that the 
guarantees were not “necessary” is a matter of opinion rather 
than a recitation of historical fact.   
We point out that, although the observation is not 
controlling, we cannot dismiss at least the possibility, if not the 
likelihood, that Merrill Lynch would not have made the loans 
without the CFC guarantees.  There is no way to know for sure 
if it would have taken that position because Appellant was in 
control of the CFCs and the circumstances at the time of the 
loans cannot be recreated.  Though we realize that Merrill Lynch 
could have made the loans on the basis of the parent entity’s 
creditworthiness, we see no reason to doubt that it made its 
decision based on its assessment of the parent entity’s ability to 
repay the loans and the guarantees on which it insisted.  After 
all, Merrill Lynch surely recognized that it could have sought to 
recover the loans from the CFCs, if necessary to do so if the 
parent entity did not repay them.  In sum, we are satisfied that 
the guarantees were properly included in Appellant’s income. 
B.  The Tax Rate 
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 Appellant’s final argument is that even if income was 
validly attributed to it by the regulations, the tax rate on the 
income should be the favorable rate applicable to dividends in 
the years in question, rather than the higher rate applicable to 
ordinary income, because the statutes deem the repatriation “as 
if it were a dividend.”  Dougherty, 60 T.C. at 926; see SIH 
Partners, 2018 WL 487089, at *18.  The Tax Court rejected this 
argument, as it held “[t]he fact that [the Act] in operation treat[s] 
a CFC’s investment in United States property ‘as if it were a 
dividend’ in no way establishes that the income inclusions 
required for shareholders thereunder actually are dividends for 
general purposes of the Code.”  Id.  The Court, of course, was 
correct—analogizing one concept to another does not make 
them completely interchangeable. 
We start our analysis of the tax rate issue by pointing out 
that the obligation of a United States person is just one type of 
property the Act defines as an investment in United States 
properties for income inclusion purposes.  Other types of 
property include tangible property, stock in a domestic 
corporation, intellectual property rights, inventions, designs, and 
trade secrets.  26 U.S.C. § 956(c)(1).  Accordingly, a CFC’s 
domestic shareholders incur taxable income when the CFC 
makes an investment in United States properties—that is, if it 
simply purchased domestic land, stock, or intellectual property 
rights for whatever purpose regardless of whether it distributed 
any such purchases to any shareholder.  Under Appellant’s 
proposed construction, all such income would become 
“dividends,” which we understood it conceded at oral argument 
to be the consequence of its proposed construction.6  To 
                                                 
6 Even if we misunderstood the scope of the concession, the 
construction under Appellant’s construction would have had that 
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Appellant, they are “constructive dividends.” 
But as we have held, “unless a distribution which is 
sought to be taxed to a stockholder as a dividend is made to him 
or for his benefit it may not be regarded as either a dividend or 
the legal equivalent of a dividend.”  Holsey v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 258 F.2d 865, 868 (3d Cir. 1958) (emphasis 
added).  Indeed, the Internal Revenue Code defines dividends as 
“any distribution of property made by a corporation to its 
shareholders[.]”  26 U.S.C. § 316(a) (emphasis added).  
Appellant asks us to construe the Act in such a way as to find 
that all income inclusions under § 956 to be “constructive 
dividends,” regardless of whether any distribution has been 
made by the CFC, or whether any such investments are for the 
benefit of the domestic shareholders.  We can find no case law 
holding that a taxpayer has received dividend income when 
neither of those two criteria has been satisfied.  See Rodriguez 
v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 722 F.3d 306, 309 (5th Cir. 
2013) (finding that § 956 “inclusions do not constitute actual 
dividends because actual dividends require a distribution by a 
corporation and receipt by the shareholder”).  As such, 
Appellant’s overbroad construction of § 956 would result in 
income being classified as a “constructive dividend” even when 
that income does not come within any plausible definition of a 
“dividend.”  We reject such implausible construction of § 956 
income.7 
                                                                                                             
consequence. 
 
7 Appellant argues the agency erred in ruling that § 956(c)(1)(C) 
income is not a dividend because the agency has enacted 
regulations in the past treating certain other § 956 income as 
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We recognize the crux of Appellant’s real argument to be 
that loan guarantees under § 956(c)(1)(C) are special cases, as 
guarantees ordinarily are given for the benefit of shareholders, 
and thus loan proceeds are akin to distributions and should be 
taxed as dividends if they are taxed at all.  However, § 
956(c)(1)(C) mandates the inclusion of a loan guarantee as 
income when the CFC holds “an obligation of a United States 
person[.]”  That person does not have to be a shareholder.  In 
fact, a CFC may guarantee a loan to a charitable organization for 
charitable purposes, and if it does so the CFC’s domestic 
shareholders will receive taxable income.  To hold in that 
scenario that the domestic shareholders’ income should be 
regarded as a dividend would defy common sense.   
Furthermore, Congress knows how to deem § 951(a) 
income as dividend income for specific purposes.  See, e.g., 26 
U.S.C. §§ 904(d)(3)(G) & 960(a)(1) (2017).  Thus “Congress 
specifically designates when § 951 inclusions are to be treated 
as dividends,” but “Congress has not so stated” for purposes of 
the tax rate for qualified dividend income under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 1(h)(11)(B)(i).  Rodriguez, 722 F.3d at 311.  As the Tax Court 
noted, if Congress desired to tax § 956(c)(1)(C) income as 
dividends, it could have done so in the fifty-plus years since the 
Act’s original passage, and it did not.  SIH Partners, 2018 WL 
487089, at *18.  “[I]t is clear that Congress did not intend to 
deem as dividends the [] inclusions at issue here.  The statute is 
completely silent [on the point,] a fact which carries added 
weight when compared to the myriad provisions specifically 
                                                                                                             
dividends.  We are unsure why treating certain § 956 income as 
dividends requires the agency to treat other § 956 income as 
dividends.  Regardless, as we stated above, absent statutory 
mandate, we are powerless to compel agency action. 
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stating that certain income is to be treated as if it were a 
dividend.”  Rodriguez, 722 F.3d at 312. 
Significantly, Appellant’s own actions undermined its 
argument: in 2010 and 2011, the CFCs made distributions of 
dividends to their shareholders, and by doing so triggered the 
IRS audit leading to the income inclusion and thus to this 
litigation.  Appellant’s br. 16.  If Appellant wanted the CFCs’ 
income to be treated as dividends, it was well aware of the best 
way to do so—paying out actual dividends to shareholders.  The 
circumstance that its tax planning did not lead to a result 
favorable to it does not provide us with a reason to adopt a 
questionable construction of a well-established statute and the 
regulations under it.  As another court has stated: 
Appellants could have caused a dividend to issue. 
 They could have also paid themselves a salary or 
invested . . . earnings elsewhere.  Each of these 
decisions would have carried different tax 
implications, thereby altering our analysis.  
Appellants cannot now avoid their tax obligation 
simply because they regret the specific decision 
they made. 
Rodriguez, 722 F.3d at 310.   
 
III.   CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Tax Court’s 
January 18, 2018 decision and order in its entirety. 
